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ABSTRACT During the last few years we have witnessed an increasing 
turn to location and positioning as an integral part of the 
interaction with mobile systems. Over the last decade 
researchers have explored how location based interaction 
and communication might be used to support novel 
interactions. Prominent examples include: 
Location-based services (LBS) and context-aware systems 
typically exploit the tracking of people to offer personalised 
services. Examples of these sorts of applications include 
allowing vulnerable people to summon help to their current 
location, providing personalised guidance, ordering a taxi 
and finding the nearest cash point. To provide such 
services, information about the users’ location needs to be 
published to one or more service providers (possibly third 
party organisations.) Key factors in the acceptance of such 
systems are preservation of control and awareness of 
dissemination of this information; people using these 
services do not want to be under surveillance. The 
fundamental difference between tracking and surveillance 
is who is in control. There is little or no provision for 
access control to location information in current systems. 
- Intelligent guides that make recommendations or 
provide guidance to nearby products and services, e.g. 
find a nearby cash point, restaurant or theatre. Indeed, 
many research prototypes have been constructed based 
on this principle [2,23]. 
- Intelligent environments that allow people who work 
and live together to be aware of the location and 
activities of others. A considerable amount of this 
work is undertaken as part of ubiquitous computing 
[1]. The general model is that by exploiting users’ 
location a supporting infrastructure can provide a 
reactive environment that responds to the activities of 
those who inhabit them. 
In this paper we offer a scheme whereby users can reveal 
their position to trusted parties whenever they want to, and 
retain control over the dissemination of their position to 
others. Furthermore, our scheme does not compromise the 
ability of the service provider to offer their services to users 
or gather statistical and demographic information on the 
systems’ usage. 
- The development of location based services that tailor 
services to the needs of users. For example, the 
ordering of taxi or delivery can exploit the location 
information provided by the users’ technology. A 
number of commercial ventures are currently 
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considering the deployment of the first generation of 
these systems [24]. 
- Applications to support the Elderly, infirm or 
vulnerable. These systems allow users to have their 
location monitored to offer a ‘panic alarm’ facility. 
Upon pressing a panic button, or perhaps triggered by 
observations of the person’s movements (or lack of 
movement) an alarm condition could be signalled, 
summoning help. Examples of this form of tracking are 
seen in the work on the aware home at Georgia Tech 
[12] and industrial research endeavours such as 
Cooltown [6]. In fact, commercial GPS panic alarms 
are already on the market [17]. 
- A number of ‘social’ and entertainment applications 
including location based games that allow people to 
play “on the street” games [18]. 
This is clearly a far from exhaustive set of applications. 
Others include Emergency notification and dispatch; Fleet 
tracking; Information services such as traffic, weather, 
Yellow Pages; Road management by remote control; Zoned 
billing and numerous other possibilities. 
This broad and growing class of applications relies on the 
ability to track and monitor the position of users and to 
make use of this position information to drive the 
application. Recent advances in wide area positioning 
technologies based on mobile telephony and GPS has 
started to encourage commercial applications that are based 
on user tracking and location based services on a much 
wider scale [3,20]. The diversity of possibilities has led to 
location based services currently been seen by many as one 
of the major growth sectors in mobile services and one of 
the cornerstones of future 2.5G and 3G telephony systems. 
A key component in wider deployment of such services is 
the development of appropriate software platforms to allow 
decoupling of the technologies that provide location 
information (e.g. Cell of Origin, Time of Arrival, Angle of 
Arrival, Enhanced Observed Time Difference or Assisted 
GPS) and the value added service providers. We would also 
argue that development of these software platforms needs 
to pay close attention to the demands of users if they are to 
be widely accepted. 
Location based systems have not emerged without some 
controversy both within the research communities that have 
produced them and society more generally [22]. Location 
based services and the tracking of users have raised issues 
of privacy much more than any other form of computer 
technology. It is not unusual for the general public to view 
technologies that make their position available to others as 
massively intrusive, often pointing to Orwell’s vision of big 
brother [20] to highlight their mistrust in such systems. 
The tension between the potential benefits to accrue from 
the location based systems and the issues of privacy these 
systems highlight to users, presents researchers and the 
developers of future platforms with a real dilemma. How 
do we develop these technologies in such a manner that the 
privacy concerns can be addressed to the satisfaction of 
future users? 
This paper considers how we may provide support for 
privacy in this important class of systems. Our particular 
focus is on providing users with simple mechanisms that 
allow them to control the disclosure of their location. We 
present a simple framework and a generic, cheap to 
compute algorithm that has been designed to shift the 
balance of control over dissemination of location 
information from the service provider to the users of the 
system. Significantly, we believe our scheme does not 
compromise the needs of the service provider to be able to 
provide services and generate revenue through the 
provision of such services but does provide users with the 
reassurance they seek in order to subscribe to these 
systems. 
In the next section we consider the issues of privacy that 
have emerged as a result of existing experiences within 
location based systems. We then present our general 
approach and illustrate how this may be used in a number 
of scenarios. We conclude by reflecting on the scalability 
and storage implications of our approach. 
LOCATION AND PRIVACY 
The rapid growth in ubiquitous and pervasive computing 
and the development of associated applications has seen a 
corresponding rise in privacy concerns. Understanding the 
various social and technical issues generating the rising 
concerns in privacy is itself a complex matter and it is not 
clear that we yet full understand the different issues 
involved in technology and privacy [22]. In this section we 
wish to consider the particular issues of privacy that 
surrounding location based technologies and how we may 
wish to design for these issues. 
Perhaps the most well known studies of privacy and 
location surround the work undertaken by Harper et al at 
Xerox [8,9]. These studies highlighted the issues raised 
during initial experiments with the Active Badge System at 
two research labs. While the badges were initially met with 
some resistance by users and concerns of privacy where 
acknowledged, this was not universally the case. 
The point that Harper makes is that the issues of privacy are 
not simply a product of the technology but rather the ways 
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in which the technology is used. In particular, he highlights 
that one of the labs exploited the technology to meet a 
particular demand, while the purpose of the location 
technology was considerably less clear. These two classic 
studies strongly suggest that the root of the concern was not 
that ones location was known but that users felt unsure for 
what purpose this location information was being recorded 
and how this information was to be used. 
Thus the issue of privacy for location based technology 
becomes one of providing the technology in manner that 
provides users with significant levels of control. In 
particular, the technology needs to give those whose 
location is being tracked mechanisms that allow them some 
understanding about and control over who is using this 
information. Without this control, a significant asymmetry 
exists in the relationship between those carrying the 
technology (the observed) and those who make use of the 
information it provides (the observer.) 
This notion of asymmetry also underpins the work by Jian 
et al on the development of a framework for privacy within 
Ubiquitous computing [10]. Building upon earlier work 
within economics, Jian et al highlight the problematic 
issues that emerge from the power imbalance within 
“Asymmetric Information” arrangements. They suggest 
that the key to managing privacy within ubiquitous 
computing is the principle of minimum asymmetry. They 
define the principle of minimal asymmetry as: 
“A privacy aware system should minimize the asymmetry of 
information between the data owners and data collectors 
and data users, by: 
− Decreasing the flow of information from data 
owners to data collectors and users 
− Increasing the flow of information from data 
collectors and users back to data owners” 
At first glance realising this principle for location based 
systems is problematic in that we need to provide a 
continual stream of location values to an infrastructure in 
order that our context can be inferred and exploited by data 
users. However, without some attention to this principle, it 
is difficult to see how we may attend within the 
technological infrastructure to the concerns of privacy 
surrounding this technology. 
Although these information limiting principles will be the 
main drivers of the service described in this paper, we also 
recognise that it is not sufficient to ensure ‘privacy’ in a 
wider sense. 
One fundamental is that privacy is not maintained simply 
by limiting or minimising information flow. One problem 
is that privacy is not monotonic [6] – sometimes less 
information can be more private than more. For example, 
the press by only reporting part of a story may make it 
more newsworthy but less acceptable for the subject. This 
is also central to the early work on video privacy on which 
Jian et al’s work indirectly draws. One of the key principles 
in Bellotti and Sellen [3] is feedback – knowing what is 
being given to whom. Maximising this feedback can be as 
important as minimising the outflow – even when 
anonymised. Indeed in Dix [6] we find an example of road 
usage monitoring, where counting the number of cars 
passing is completely anonymous; yet the data may be used 
to make implications about further traffic development 
which those actually using the road would find 
objectionable. 
Adams, based on previous work, lists three factors for 
privacy, all of which emphasise the richness of the concept: 
• Information sensitivity: This is not just a matter of 
private/not private, different people in different 
circumstance may regard the same information as 
more or less valuable to be private. 
• Information receiver: Trust of the recipient is 
central to people’s acceptance of monitoring, so 
(re-enforcing the feedback discussion) knowing 
who may use information is crucial. 
• Information usage: Adams reflects concerns in 
both Bellotti & Sellen [3] and Dix [6] that the 
purpose of use is also critical. Indeed this is a key 
element of the UK Data Protection legislation. 
In this paper, we do not focus on the wider concerns of 
information sensitivity or usage of the location information 
that we have highlighted. Rather, we focus on providing a 
simple mechanism to allow users to manage the flow of 
information through a simple and scaleable encoding 
technique. 
Key to the approach we suggest is packaging location based 
data in a way that allows users to control who can readily 
understand the information. In particular, we make a 
separation between the location data stating a device is at a 
given location, the time the position data was obtained and 
the user the data is associated with. Our encoding focuses 
on providing this data in a manner that cannot be 
understood until the data owner has given permission. The 
need for this explicit communication ensures that this 
arrangement meets the principle of minimum asymmetry 
and ensures a balance of control between the person whose 
location is being tracked and those who would seek to use 
this information. 
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The more components an observer is able to ascertain at 
one time, the greater the information revealed about the 
user. An observer who possesses location and time and is 
able to affirm the user’s identity using other means 
(correlating against other telemetry or observational data, 
for example) may be able to periodically establish the 
user’s location. However, the key to establishing where our 
user is at any given time is only through knowing who the 
person is and having the ability to chain these measures 
together. In fact, the user’s identity is the key to 
understanding this location information and controlling its 
disclosure. The association of identity with the other 
elements of location underpins our approach to the 
management of privacy in location-based systems. 
In the following section we outline the key elements of our 
approach and show how this simple separation allows users 
increased access and control over the use of their location 
information. 
A PRIVACY ORIENTED LOCATION FRAMEWORK 
Irrespective of the technologies involved in gathering and 
recording users’ location, a system tracking location over 
time must record and represent three key pieces of 
information: 
- The location of the user (in a given coordinate system) 
- The time at which the location of the user was 
observed 
- The identity of the user (a unique identifier) 
Basic Approach 
Our approach to managing privacy exploits this underlying 
structure of location-based systems. Essentially, an 
observer must possess all three of these components 
simultaneously in order to know where a given user 
currently is with any degree of certainty. 
Let us start by considering the ways in which location 
based systems tend to be currently considered. In most 
approaches we can distinguish three parties in our system 
that correspond to the principle of minimal asymmetry 
outlined in the previous section: 
Any single component in isolation provides very little 
information to an observer. For example, given the location 
samples in isolation the observer is merely able to 
determine that locations have been visited at some point in 
time. Since the identity relationship of the data cannot be 
resolved; the observer cannot know whether successive 
location samples belong to the same or any other user of the 
system. If the time relationship between the samples cannot 
be established, then the observer cannot dependably 
construct a path a given user has followed nor their speed 
or direction. Identity without time or location does not help 
our observer locate the person, just their registration with 
the system. The time that the samples are taken is possibly 
the least useful component in isolation. 
- The holder (the data owner) is someone who carries a 
personal wearable device, such as a mobile phone. 
- The location service (the data collector) provides a 
location service to the holder. The service provider can 
at any time establish where a holder is. This could be 
by means of triangulation with mobile phone devices, 
or through an external tracking device. 
- The third party (the data user) is an organisation that 
makes use of the information and may provide a 
location-based service to the holder. It will normally 
obtain location data from the service provider. 
Most existing arrangements are based on the location 
service passing location information onto the third party. 
(figure 1). 
Knowing two of these elements increases the amount we 
can know, but is still limited. Given location and identity 
the observer can establish all the locations visited by every 
user. However, without time, the path that the user has 
taken can only be inferred probabilistically. Significantly, 
assuming a reasonable number of samples, the observer 
cannot know which of the sampled locations the user is 
currently at, nor even if the location information is recent 
enough to be of relevance. Location and time offers the 
observer the ability to infer where users of the system have 
been. Analysis of trends in this data might yield potential 
paths with some degree of probability. However, without 
identity, the sampling interval or margin of error in the 
sample data, and the potential for paths to cross would limit 
the usefulness of this data. Lastly, identity and time taken 
together without location only allows the observation of the 
system’s usage over time. 
The location service The location service 
The Holder The Holder 
Third party offering a 
location based service







Figure 1: the current asymmetrical arrangement 
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Under this arrangement the holder tends not to have any 
control over the third parties using the location information 
collected by the location service and often may not be 
informed even that third parties are using this information. 
This asymmetrical arrangement significantly differs from 
the ideal suggested by Jian et al [10]. We wish to alter this 
arrangement to provide a much more symmetrical flow of 
information for location based systems. 
Our premise is that the holders should have full control 
over their own location information. However, by the same 
token, the service provider may not want to yield total 
control over this location data because it has commercial 
value and can be sold on to third parties to provide value 
added services (providing the holder agrees that this is what 
should be done.) What is important is that this disclosure is 
understood by the user and that a symmetrical relationship 
is reached between the user and the observer. 
The scheme that we propose requires that rather than 
storing the position and identity of each holder (c.f. the 
home location register in GSM), the system provider 
instead stores at any time a triple of the form: 
(Location, Time, Pseudonym) 
- The Location is a holder’s location in a given 
coordinate system. 
- The Time is the time that the holder was at that 
location. 
- The Pseudonym is a unique number that is related to a 
holder for a given time interval. It is up to the holder to 
choose a random number X to be used as their 
pseudonym. At any given time a user may have a 
number of active pseudonyms. 
In order to prevent collisions we must pick X from a 
suitably large space (a 128-bit number would provide 
ample encodings.) The number X must be a ‘true’ random 
number, not generated using a pseudo random sequence – 
note that this is not an unreasonable requirement as mobile 
devices should easily be able to gather entropy to seed 
random number generators (a process they often perform 
anyway since the key exchange protocols used in 
encryption rely on random data.) 
Managing the disclosure of the Pseudonym X allows the 
holder to control the disclosure of their location 
information and establishes a more symmetric arrangement. 
The holder knows at any given time that they have given 
others permission to observe them by telling them the 
pseudonym they are currently using. 
Essentially the only way for a third party to make use of the 
location information associated with a given holder is to 
enter into some form of service agreement where the 
mapping the between the holder’s identity and the random 
number pseudonym is provided as part of the agreement. 
This more symmetrical data arrangement is shown in figure 
2. 
The location service The location service 
The Holder The Holder 
Third party offering a 
location based service











Figure 2: A symmetrical location service 
The holder may choose to change the random number used 
as the Pseudonym at any time allowing them to alter the set 
of third parties to who they have disclosed their location 
information. 
Supporting location based service agreements 
This basic arrangement allows the holder to establish 
simple location-based service agreements with third parties. 
For example, let us consider a simple scenario where a user 
(the holder) requests a taxi to their current location from a 
taxi service (the third party) by pressing a button on their 
mobile device. 
1. The mobile device will pick a pseudonym, X’, and will 
inform the service provider that this is an active 
pseudonym for the holder. This will cause the service 
provider to log location information from the holder 
under X’. 
2. The pseudonym X’ is provided to the third party as part 
of the agreement with the taxi service. The taxi service 
can then query the service provider to find out the 
holder’s location. Note that the taxi service can keep 
querying the position until the holder decides to change 
their pseudonym at which point they can no longer find 
any information on the holder. 
3. The holder changes the pseudonym to complete the 
service agreement when the taxi collects them. 
Changing the pseudonym essentially revokes the taxi 
firm’s access to their location information. 
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- We can give three groups of people A, B and C, keys 
KA, Kb and Kc respectively. 
Note that this solution is elegant, because the service 
provider is a “trusted party”. The taxi company picks the 
position information up from the service provider in the 
knowledge that this is a genuine request. - We then store pairs (A, Enc(KA,X)), (B, Enc(Kb,X)) 
and (C, Enc(Kc,X)) so that these groups can, on 
demand, retrieve the holders latest value for X, 
allowing them to find out where we are. 
In order to allow us to be involved in more than one service 
agreement at any given time we need to register our active 
pseudonyms with the service provider. In order to prevent 
unauthorized access, the pseudonym should be encrypted 
with a key that is provided to the third party. 
- If we ever want to change the pseudonym associated 
with the service agreement, we will simply update the 
encrypted pseudonyms at the service provider, 
allowing all people to retrieve our new pseudonym. At 
any time we can revoke permissions to a third party by 
changing the pseudonym and not updating the 
encrypted values within the stored pair for that party. 
In the case of our taxi example where we are dealing with a 
third party T would generate a key KT. We would then store 
pairs (T, Enc(KT, X’)) allowing the third party to retrieve 
the pseudonym at will. Note that while T could pass on X’ 
to other providers illegally, we have not revealed the user’s 
true identity, nor allowed access to location data other than 
that scoped by its association with X’. In a ‘real’ system, 
one might expect additional legal protection to further 
reduce the likelihood of such abuses. 
The main aim of our approach has been to develop an 
arrangement for location based services based on a more 
symmetrical flow of information, allowing the user some 
control over the dissemination of their location information. 
We have done this by making the holder a key member of 
any location service agreement. In order to be able to track 
the location of a user, a third party needs to be given an 
active pseudonym from the user. This means that the data 
owner has control over the disclosure of his location 
information to third parties and users may consequently be 
more likely to accept these forms of technology. 
Managing group service agreements 
A common use of location-based system is to allow a larger 
group of people to track where we are. This is for example 
useful for people who are on their way to a meeting or 
across a sales team. This means that we need to consider 
how best to support location service agreements that 
involve multiple parties. One approach would be to select a 
pseudonym X’ for the service agreement as we did for a 
single transaction, and pass it on to all people who we want 
to allow to track us. This will work, but only in a limited 
way and raises some new demands. If a day later we want 
to allow one more person to know where we go, but we do 
not want to reveal to this new person where we have been, 
then a new pseudonym X” has to be picked, which has to 
be sent out to all people again. In addition, a new 
pseudonym will have to be chosen with some regularity, in 
order to prevent our traces from becoming tractable. 
SCALABILITY AND DEPLOYMENT 
In order to support our system, the location service will 
have to store all the location triplets and be able to update 
holder’s pseudonyms when required. In addition, it should 
provide the encryption service for stored pseudonyms. It is 
reasonable to question why the service provider would wish 
to provide this registration service, and whether this service 
can be provided in a scalable manner. 
We estimate that the amount of work to be performed is 
minimal; only when the mobile device communicates with 
the service provider is there any work that needs to be 
performed. Data storage overhead is minimal, consisting of 
a couple of bytes per location sample, since only 
differences from the previous signal need to be stored. 
Precise location estimates requiring more computations can 
be computed on demand, for example when the taxi is 
about to pick someone up. 
Essentially we need to allow the location service to provide 
a mechanism that allows the third parties involved in a 
location-based service agreement to be dynamically altered. 
Changing the pseudonym associated with the service 
agreement whenever we alter the set of third parties 
involved allows us to manage the level of disclosure across 
the group involved but we need to reduce the cost of this 
change. 
Importantly, these services do not have to be provided for 
free. Text messages are charged between £0.05 and £0.10, 
and are very popular, and it would not be unreasonable to 
charge holders a nominal fee, say £0.01, for changing their 
identity and managing the service level agreement. There is 
a value for holders to be anonymous when they use 
location-based services, so we recommend combining these 
charges transparently into the cost of the service itself. In 
Allowing the location service to store the mapping between 
our active pseudonyms and those we have disclosed these 
to provides a low cost way to manage this process. Let us 
illustrate the flexible group management process with a 
simple example. 
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addition, service providers can charge third parties a 
nominal fee for providing location information. 
Because all the data is stored in anonymised form, the 
service provider can sell data off to third parties without 
fear of compromising the subscribers. For example, pure 
location information is useful in identifying hot spots, 
popular traffic routes, and utilisation of services. Tracks of 
data can be used by recommender systems for data mining 
purposes without requiring precise identity. If they choose, 
a person can supply a non-anonymous track of data in order 
to obtain a precise recommendation. 
As this information is provided in aggregate form, it 
reduces the threat of compromising the privacy of any 
individual. However, while aggregate information is clearly 
a lot less sensitive than personal information it still requires 
some care. First, it may be possible to reconstruct 
individual data from aggregate data. This has been 
demonstrated to be a problem in census data which in many 
countries is publicly available. 
For example, you may be able to ask for the age 
distribution in households in a particular area of a town. By 
asking multiple queries of this sort it can be possible to 
recreate the raw data. As a simple example, imagine there 
were only three houses (A,B,C) and you obtained the 
average of A&B, B&C and A&C, it is then easily possible 
to find the individual household data. This possibility to 
compromise statistical data has been widely studied but can 
be solved by randomly perturbing the summary data [12]. 
Even where the aggregate data does not allow individual 
data to be recovered, it may be unacceptable to the original 
data subjects depending on the purpose to which it is being 
put. This is exactly the case in the example already cited 
from [6]: Imagine a parent driving their child a short 
distance down a busy road to school each morning because 
the road is too busy for the child to walk. Their journeys 
add to the recorded traffic usage and lead the planning 
authority to increase the size and speed of the road – 
exactly the opposite of what the parents would want. 
How to protect against data mining attacks or 
miscommunication of the usage of location data is outside 
the scope of this paper. However, introducing statistical 
variance to further anonymise location samples is not 
incompatible with our approach. We have also assumed in 
our target application domain that the user is well aware of 
how their location data is to be used (e.g. by personally 
opting-in to specific, well understood services.) 
RELATED WORK 
The use of pseudonyms to protect identity in location based 
systems in not new. Hauser and Kabatnik [10] as part of the 
NEXUS project [18], suggest a scheme involving virtual 
identities (VIDs) as principles which are similar to our 
pseudonyms. The scheme, based on public key encryption 
differs from our scheme in that VIDs are assumed to be 
long lived, and thus trust relationships are established using 
digital certificates. The NEXUS system can support the 
notion of ‘area queries’ in addition to the location of 
individuals. 
Our system is significantly more lightweight than that 
proposed by Hauser and Kabatnik, and differs 
fundamentally in that our pseudonyms are completely 
transient. 
Leonhardt and Magee [15] propose a scheme in which 
identity can be protected through a sequence of chained 
idempotent filters governed by a rich formal policy 
language. In their scheme policies governing access 
control, visibility and anonymity may be stated allowing 
potential implementation in a distributed fashion. Policies 
may be specified over individuals or groups of users. Our 
approach does not preclude the use of such policies to 
control the dissemination of pseudonyms and control 
contract negotiation with location based service providers. 
Kesdogan et al [13] propose a method in which temporary 
pseudonymous identities are used to protect the identity of 
users in the GSM system. A Pseudo-Mobile Subscriber 
Identity (PMSI) is assigned by a Home Trusted Device 
(HTD). The user registers with the GSM using their PMSI 
and the location of the mobile terminal is associated with 
the user’s pseudonym. When an incoming phone call 
occurs, the real identity must be revealed to allow 
placement of the call. To solve the potential availability 
problem the HTD function may be delegated to a trusted 
third party. In this approach, the pseudonyms are changed 
synchronously at regular intervals. Partial pseudonyms are 
distributed across a group of trusted parties to prevent 
inference of links between the pseudonyms. 
A central tenet of our approach is allowing the user to 
determine when their pseudonymous identity is changed, a 
key different of our approach is thus that pseudonym 
management is assumed to be controlled on the user’s end-
terminal. We have not as yet specifically aimed to address 
issues of badly behaved third parties who collaborate to try 
to affirm our identity or contiguous movements – such 
attacks are difficult however as the user can change their 
pseudonym at will and (with the group enhancement we 
suggest) limit the distribution of this new identity. 
SUMMARY 
In this paper we have proposed an arrangement for location 
based services that provide users access to location based 
services while providing mechanisms that provide them 
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with some protection of their privacy. Key to our approach 
has been arranging the service in such a manner that 
facilitates user control over disclosure of their location 
information. 
8. Harper, R. 1992. Looking at Ourselves: An 
Examination of the Social Organization of Two 
Research Laboratories. Proc. ACM Conf. Computer-
Supported Cooperative Work CSCW’92 (Toronto, 
Ontario), 330-337. New York: ACM. 
In order to achieve this we have adopted the principle of 
minimal asymmetry suggested by Jian et al [10] and 
structured recording of location information in such a way 
that third parties who wish to exploit location information 
for a given user need to reach a service agreement in order 
to have full access to the location based information. 
9. Harper, R., Lamming, M. & Newman, W. 1992. 
Locating Systems at Work: Implications for the 
Development of Active Badge Applications. 
Interacting with Computers, 4 (3), 343-363. 
10. Hauser, C. and Kabatnik, M., “Towards privacy 
support in a global location service”, Proceedings of 
the IFIP Workshop on IP and ATM Traffic 
Management (WATM/EUNICE 2001), pp. 81-89, 
Paris, September 2001. 
The suggested arrangement is designed to be both simple to 
implement and to be readily understood by end users. It is 
important that the model provided to the end user is readily 
comprehensible in order to provide the level of reassurance 
needed to encourage the take up of location based systems, 
given the current resistance to this class of system. 
11. Jiang X., Hong J, Landay J “ Approximate Information 
Flows: Socially-Based Modeling of Privacy in 
Ubiquitous computing” in proceedings of 
Ubicomp2002, LNCS, 2498, Springer Verlag, pp 176-
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